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Abstract
Implicit theories of intelligence were investigated via surveys 
of exemplars of intelligence. Study 1 was a four-sample sur-
vey of famous exemplars. These diverse samples reported a 
similar set of popular exemplars, which clustered into five 
groups. These groups represented five types of intelligence: 
scientific, artistic, entrepreneurial, communicative, and moral 
intelligence. In Study 2, the minimal overlap of intelligence 
exemplars with those of fame, creativity, and wisdom re-
futed the possibility that exemplar reports are indiscriminate 
or solely a result of availability. In Study 3, knowledgeable 
judges rated the similarity of 50 famous persons to exemplars 
representing each type of intelligence. All five similarity rat-
ings predicted exemplar popularities. In Study 4, where ex-
emplar reports were not restricted to famous people, 31% 
were nonfamous (friends, family members, teachers, etc.). 
The results indicate that five implicit types of intelligence, 
each represented by highly available exemplars, play a role 
in people’s implicit theories. 
Research on implicit theories of intelligence ad-
dresses lay perceptions and conceptions of intelli-
gence. The topic is typically contrasted with the more 
traditional research on explicit theories of intelligence, 
that is, claims about the nature of cognitive perfor-
mance and individual differences therein. It can be ar-
gued that research on implicit theories is actually the 
more important approach because its influence extends 
to everyday social interactions, voting preferences, and 
coping as well as scholastic and job evaluations (Ho-
gan & Hogan, 1994; Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 1995; Stern-
berg, 1988). 
Interest in the topic began with two 1979 articles that 
proposed the cognitive representation of intelligence 
as a prototype (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Neisser, 1979). 
The prototype model suggests that we store a template 
of attributes representing our ideal of an intelligent per-
son and we judge others as intelligent to the extent that 
they match the attributes in our prototype of intelli-
gence (Neisser, 1979). Extensive work by Sternberg and 
his colleagues revealed substantial empirical support for 
these propositions (Sternberg, 1985; Sternberg, Conway, 
Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981). Their methods were largely 
straightforward: Lay judges were asked what they mean 
by the term intelligent and other mental abilities. Among 
other things, this research demonstrated that prototypes 
of intelligence are distinct from those of related mental 
abilities such as creativity and wisdom.1 This early pro-
totype work has since been followed up by others study-
ing implicit theories of intelligence (e.g., Kosmitzki & 
John, 1993; Raty & Snellman, 1997; Ruisel, 1996) and per-
sonality traits (Broughton, 1984; Chaplin, John, & Gold-
berg, 1988; John, 1986; Rush & Russell, 1988). 
An alternative to prototype theory is exemplar the-
ory (e.g., Nosofsky, 1992; Smith & Zarate, 1992). Here, 
an individual’s cognitive representation of the trait “in-
telligent” is assumed to include memories of intelligent 
individuals with whom the perceiver has had experi-
ence. As far as we know, the only empirical work on in-
telligence from an exemplar perspective comes from 
our own laboratory (Paulhus, 2000; Paulhus & Landolt, 
2000). There we examined the stability across 16 years 
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of famous exemplars reported by college students. The 
rationale was that the popularity of exemplars reveals 
something about a culture’s conception of intelligence. 
Such popular exemplars included Albert Einstein, U.S. 
President, Da Vinci, and Shakespeare. The top 15 ac-
counted for 83% of the exemplar reports. Those data 
suggest that a small set of shared exemplars play a role 
in our conceptions of intelligence. 
In the present report, we pursued the promise of an 
exemplar approach in four studies. In particular, we 
collected several types of nomination and rating data 
to evaluate the generalizability and discriminant va-
lidity of the Paulhus and Landolt (2000) findings. In 
Study 1, participants were simply asked to name a fa-
mous example of an intelligent person. The results 
were tabulated and compared across a variety of nomi-
nator samples. Study 2 examined whether judges could 
discriminate among intelligent, creative, and wise ex-
emplars. Study 3 investigated various attributes of 
candidates likely to influence their probability of be-
ing nominated. In Study 4, exemplar reports were left 
unrestricted to explore the influence of nonfamous 
exemplars. 
Study 1: How Consensual Are Famous Exemplars? 
The temporal consistency in famous exemplars found 
by Paulhus and Landolt (2000) might be attributable to 
sampling students in the same school. To evaluate con-
sistency across more diverse samples, we compiled ex-
emplar reports from four sources: (a) 244 students at the 
University of California, Berkeley; (b) 153 students at the 
University of Georgia; (c) 401 students at the University 
of British Columbia; and (d) 351 adults from the Van-
couver, Canada, area. Participants were asked to give 
an ideal example of a famous intelligent person. Results 
were compiled and used to facilitate subsequent class-
room discussion of the concept of intelligence. 
Method 
The instructor solicited exemplar reports from the stu-
dent samples before the topic of intelligence was covered 
in lectures. The topic was not in any of the textbooks and, 
therefore, did not contaminate the exemplar reports. The 
exemplar reports were voluntary, although less than 1% 
declined. Responses were submitted on a sheet of paper 
along with the nominator’s sex and year in university. 
Student data (N = 798) were collected from under-
graduate psychology classes. The sex breakdown was 
similar across samples, ranging from 60% to 66% fe-
male. Sex differences in exemplar reports were neither 
clear nor consistent; therefore, the data were combined 
across sex (with the exceptions specifically noted). 
Data collection began with the following instructions 
being read aloud: 
Think of an ideal example of an intelligent person. 
Not a friend or family member, but someone who 
is well known—alive or not. Write the name on a 
sheet of paper and hand it in. Don’t put your name 
or any identification on it. I will compile the names 
and give you the results of the survey in the next 
class. 
The adult data (N = 351) were collected by asking stu-
dents to solicit an exemplar report from one of their par-
ents or some other individual older than age 30. The stu-
dent took home a form with instructions similar to the 
above. The form asked the adult nominators to indi-
cate their relationship with the student and their phone 
number. The latter requirement has been found in the 
past to ensure that the reports were actually completed 
by the adults (Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998). In the pres-
ent adult sample, 55% were women and 70% were fam-
ily members. 
Results and Discussion 
Exemplar report frequencies. Table 1 provides the top 15 
nominees for the four samples: (a) a 1980s student sam-
ple from a Southeastern U.S. university, (b) a 1990s sam-
ple from a West Coast U.S. university, (c) a 1990s sam-
ple from a Northwestern Canadian university, and (d) a 
1980s adult sample from Vancouver, Canada. The simi-
larity across samples is striking, particularly at the top of 
the lists. Eight individuals appear on all four: Einstein, 
U.S. President, Da Vinci, Isaac Newton, Shakespeare, 
Mozart, Oprah Winfrey, and Stephen Hawking. Two 
others, the contemporary Canadian and British Prime 
Ministers, appeared in the top 15 for the two Canadian 
samples. The similarity across samples was indexed by 
taking the top 20 from each list (36 in total) and correlat-
ing their frequencies across the four samples. All inter-
correlations exceeded r = .81, p < .01. 
The student lists were particularly close: Across time, 
across countries, and across schools, the most popular 
exemplars were consistent. The adult list is also similar 
but reflects cultural and generational differences: It in-
cluded three Americans (Walter Cronkite, Bob Dylan, 
and Henry Kissinger) and one Canadian (Pierre Berton) 
who do not appear on the student lists—presumably be-
cause their influence has diminished considerably over 
the last generation. When the lists were restricted to liv-
ing individuals, another interesting pattern emerged. 
Here, the U.S. president led all four lists. In the Cana-
dian samples, the Canadian Prime Minister ranked sec-
ond. Clearly, national leaders are among the most prom-
inent exemplars of intelligence. 
Clusters of famous exemplars. Despite the consistency 
across samples, the diversity within popular nominees 
is striking. Consider how the very concept of intelli-
gence appears to shift across such popular nominees as 
Einstein, the U.S. President, Shakespeare, Bill Gates, Mo-
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zart, Oprah Winfrey, and Martin Luther King. To clarify 
this diversity, we conducted a multidimensional scaling 
analysis of the top 15 nominees.2 
A sample of 12 knowledgeable judges were asked to 
rate the pairwise similarity of the 15 exemplars with re-
spect to their intelligence. The sample of judges was lim-
ited to faculty members and graduate students to en-
sure a reasonable familiarity with all of the exemplars. 
All confirmed that they were quite familiar with the 15 
exemplars. The 10-point rating scale was anchored by 
the labels minimal (1) and maximal (10). The interrater in-
tercorrelations across the 105 similarity ratings ranged 
from .59 to 1.00, with a mean of .75. As a panel, the rat-
ers yielded an alpha of .96, indicating sufficient similar-
ity in the judges’ perceptions to combine their ratings. 
The mean of each of the 105 pairwise similarities was 
calculated across the 12 judges. These similarities were 
submitted to SPSS-ALSCAL to perform a multidimen-
sional scaling of the 15 exemplars. The two-dimensional 
solution, presented in Figure 1, yielded interpretable 
clusters in the minimal number of dimensions with an 
acceptable stress value (.04). Dimension 1 (horizontal) 
can be loosely interpreted as public versus private com-
munication running from those working privately (sci-
entists, writers) to those working publicly (politicians, 
etc.). Dimension 2 (vertical) is loosely interpretable as a 
subjective versus physical domain, that is, a qualitative 
shift from those dealing with the subjective (Mozart, 
Gandhi) to those dealing with the physical world (Edi-
son, Gates, Ted Turner). 
More illuminating than the dimensions were the clus-
ters themselves. Figure 1 reveals that the exemplars 
have separated into five distinctive clusters: We labeled 




















intelligence (Mozart, Shakespeare), entrepreneurial in-
telligence (Turner, Trump, Gates), communicative intel-
ligence (President, Prime Minister, Winfrey), and moral 
intelligence (e.g., Gandhi, M. L. King). 
Conclusion 
There was a marked similarity across samples in the 
most popular exemplars of intelligence. Only minor dif-
ferences appeared across various educated samples in 
North America. Within these popular exemplars, a di-
versity of worldviews was reflected in the emergence 
of five clusters. Consistent with earlier work (Gardner, 
1998; Sternberg, 1988), intelligence was found to be a 
heterogeneous concept even within educated samples. 
Unlike earlier work, we isolated five types of intelli-
Table 1. The Top 15 Exemplars of Intelligence (with percentage of total reports) in Study 1 
U. of California  U. of Georgia  Canadian Students  Canadian Adults 
Students (N = 244)   Students (N = 153)   (N = 401)   (N = 351)  
Fall 1996    Fall 1981    1982-1997    1988, 1992 
Einstein (30)  Einstein (33)  Einstein (27)  Einstein (25) 
U.S. President (11)  U.S. President (10)  U.S. President (8)  U.S. President (9) 
Thomas Edison (7)  Da Vinci (6)  Canadian P.M. (7)  Canadian P.M. (6) 
Stephen Hawking (6)  Shakespeare (5)  Da Vinci (5) Shakespeare (6) 
Bill Gates (6)  Thomas Edison (5)  Isaac Newton (5)  Thomas Edison (3) 
Isaac Newton (4)  Isaac Newton (5)  Bill Gates (5)  Da Vinci (3) 
Da Vinci(4)  Oprah Winfrey (4)  Stephen Hawking (5)  Henry Kissinger (3) 
Wolfgang Mozart (3)  Lee Iacocca (4)  Shakespeare (4)  Isaac Newton (3) 
Shakespeare (3)  British P.M. (3)  Thomas Edison (4)  Wolfgang Mozart (2) 
Oprah Winfrey (3)  Donald Trump (3)  Oprah Winfrey (4)  Pierre Berton (2) 
Sigmund Freud (3)  Wolfgang Mozart (3)  British P.M. (3)  Walter Cronkite (2) 
Stephen Spielberg (2)  Sigmund Freud (3)  Wolfgang Mozart (2)  Stephen Hawking (2) 
Diane Feinstein (2)  Carl Sagan (2)  David Suzuki (2)  Oprah Winfrey (2) 
Malcolm X (2)  M. L. King (2)  Sigmund Freud (2)  Bob Dylan (2) 
Noam Chomsky (2)  Jimmy Carter (2)  Madonna (2)  British P.M. (2) 
P.M. = prime minister
Figure 1. Two-dimensional solution from a multidimensional 
scaling of 15 exemplars. (PM = prime minister) 
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gence considered to be important and distinctive by our 
lay and expert judges. 
The ultimate value of such exemplar analyses lies in 
showing that people can make use of the distinctions 
emerging here: This utility is evaluated in Studies 3 and 
4. First, the issue of discriminant validity warrants some 
attention. 
Study 2: Discriminant Validity—Intelligence Versus 
Creativity, Wisdom, and Sheer Fame 
Intelligence, along with creativity, and wisdom may 
be subsumed into a higher level category, namely, men-
tal ability (Sternberg, 1985). Data collected within the 
prototype paradigm showed that expert and lay judges 
alike made clear distinctions among the concepts of in-
telligence, creativity, and wisdom (Holliday & Chan-
dler, 1986). Presumably, it has proven useful to retain 
such distinctions in the English language as well as in 
the shared cognition of Western culture (Ruzgis & Gri-
gorenko, 1994; Thompson & Fine, 1999). If ideal exem-
plars are linked to or are parallel to these three proto-
types, then similar distinctions should appear among 
exemplars of intelligent, creative, and wise persons. 
It is particularly important to establish this distinc-
tiveness given the present self-report method of identi-
fying exemplars. The sheer salience of certain individu-
als in our society may fully explain why they dominated 
the exemplar reports (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The 
most available names will naturally be the most nomi-
nated. Perceptions of fame are sensitive even to rather 
minor influences (e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Ja-
coby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989). To directly ad-
dress the potential fame confound, we also solicited ex-
emplars of famous persons without reference to their 
intelligence: They should personify sheer fame. 
Method and Results 
Several large undergraduate classes were surveyed 
in 1993. The procedure was similar to that described in 
Study 1, with two exceptions. First, the type of exemplar 
requested was manipulated across three conditions (n 
= 101 per cell). Participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions by numbering off (1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3 . . . ) along 
each row in the class. Those in Condition 1 were asked 
to provide an exemplar of intelligence, in Condition 2 an 
exemplar for creativity, and in Condition 3 an exemplar 
for wisdom. For comparison, a sheer fame condition (n 
= 183) was created from students in a separate section of 
the same course: They were asked simply to nominate a 
famous person. 
The top 15 from each condition are listed in Table 
2. Four individuals from the creativity list overlapped 
with the intelligence list: Da Vinci, Mozart, Shake-
speare, and Madonna. Only one individual on the wise 
list (Oprah Winfrey) also appeared on the intelligence 
list.3 No individual appeared on both the creativity and 
wisdom lists. 
This pattern of overlap is entirely consistent with 
Sternberg’s work on prototypical features. Similar 
to Sternberg, we found that overlap with the intelli-
gent exemplars was higher for those on the creative 
list (27%) than for those on the wisdom list (7%). And 
the zero overlap of the top 15 exemplars for creativity 
and wisdom matches Sternberg’s (1988) demonstration 
of minimal conceptual overlap between creativity and 
wisdom. 
Overall, there is no indication from these results that 
our student judges are confusing intelligence with re-
lated mental abilities. This discriminability is sufficient 
to refute suspicions that sheer fame accounts for high 
nomination rates as exemplars of intelligence. Had this 
been the case, the same individuals would have ap-
Table 2. Nominations for Intelligent, Creative, Wise, and Famous Persons in Study 2 
 Intelligent  Creative  Wise  Sheer Fame 
1.  Einstein  Da Vinci  Ghandi  Princess Diana 
2.  Bill Clinton  Picasso  Confucius  Elvis Presley 
3.  Da Vinci  Michelangelo  Jesus Christ  Michael Jordan 
4.  Prime Minister  Mozart  M. L. King  Muhammad Ali 
5.  Gates  Spielberg  Socrates  Michael Jackson 
6.  Shakespeare  Shakespeare  Mother Theresa  Bill Clinton 
7.  Hawking  Michael Jackson  Solomon  Madonna 
8.  Oprah  Beethoven  Buddha  Wayne Gretzky 
9.  Newton  Walt Disney  Pope  Bill Gates 
10.  Mozart  Robin Williams  Oprah Winfrey  John F. Kennedy 
11.  Edison  Salvador Dali  Winston Churchill  Nelson Mandela 
12.  Suzuki  Madonna  Dali Lama  Marilyn Monroe 
13.  Madonna  Sigmund Freud  Ann Landers  Adolph Hitler 
14.  Gorbachev  Alexander Graham Bell  Nelson Mandela  George Bush, Sr. 
15.  Trudeau  Margaret Atwood  Queen Elizabeth  Jesus Christ 
Total N = 486. 
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peared on the intelligence, creativity, and wisdom lists. 
Note that we chose a between-subjects design to avoid 
the possibility that nominators might bypass their best 
exemplar for intelligence simply to save him/her for 
nomination as a creative or wise person. 
Finally, the list comprising exemplars of pure fame 
overlapped no more than 20% with any of the three 
mental ability lists. Instead, the individuals heading the 
fame list (Princess Diana, Elvis Presley, and Michael Jor-
dan) appeared on none of the ability lists. 
Together, these results make it clear that famous ex-
emplars of intelligence are more than just famous. Their 
exemplar frequencies are determined by the specific na-
ture of their (perceived) mental abilities. Study 3 was de-
signed to explore other factors likely to influence the fre-
quency of nomination of exemplars. 
Study 3: Objective Attributes of Popular Exemplars 
Study 3 permitted a more detailed analysis of the 
five types of exemplars emerging from Study 1. Hav-
ing judges evaluate all the exemplars would provide a 
more powerful design for understanding why certain 
exemplars were generated so often. Unfortunately, we 
found the knowledge base of the undergraduate stu-
dents rather idiosyncratic: In a random sample of 22 un-
dergraduate students from our subject pool, the mean 
recognition rate (yes/no) from a list of 50 famous exem-
plars of intelligence was only 42%. 
To avoid these complications, we sought the cooper-
ation of judges knowledgeable enough to rate a diverse 
set of exemplars. Accordingly, in Study 3, two sets of 
knowledgeable judges were asked to rate the proto-
type and exemplar attributes of 50 of the exemplars 
collected from the local student sample in Study 1: The 
50 were selected from the original 75 to maximize di-
versity while retaining the top 15. Regression analyses 
were then used to evaluate the independent contribu-
tion of each attribute in predicting previous exemplar 
frequencies. 
Lay prototype variables. Previous research by Sternberg 
and colleagues has identified three prototypical features 
of lay prototypes of intelligence, namely, problem-solv-
ing ability, verbal ability, and social competence (Stern-
berg, 1985). Accordingly, we asked one set of judges to 
rate all 50 candidates on these three dimensions. 
Exemplariness variables. To pursue the exemplar ap-
proach, we asked another set of knowledgeable judges 
to rate the degree to which each of the 50 candidates ex-
emplified each of the five subgroups of intelligent exem-
plars. Rather than defining these rating dimensions with 
a label (e.g., scientific intelligence), we defined each di-
mension in terms of two exemplars from Study 1. A 
high degree of interjudge agreement would suggest that 
participants are making systematic and consensual use 
of exemplar information. 
Finally, the nomination rate of these 50 exemplars 
(derived from Study 1 data) was regressed on these eight 
predictors (in addition to fame and gender) to evaluate 
the degree to which a candidate’s nomination likelihood 
can be predicted from his or her (consensually defined) 
attributes. 
Method 
The fixed set of 50 exemplars was chosen to include 
the top 15 most common individuals over various sam-
ples in Study 1. The set included 35 others chosen for 
their diversity from the 77 remaining exemplars. 
The predictor variables in the present study were 
aimed at relatively objective qualities of the exemplars—
qualities on which knowledgeable judges would agree. 
To bypass the limited and idiosyncratic knowledge base 
of our undergraduate student samples, we chose knowl-
edgeable judges—mostly faculty and graduate students 
in psychology—on the basis of their interest and famil-
iarity with these materials. The judges were told explic-
itly to ignore their personal preferences and provide rat-
ings that captured the candidates’ objective qualities. 
Moreover, they were instructed that if not sufficiently 
familiar with a candidate, they should take time to in-
vestigate relevant information. 
All variables were rated on 7-point scales ranging 
from low (1) to high (7). One set of 10 judges rated fame, 
problem-solving ability, verbal intelligence, and social 
competence. Another set of 10 knowledgeable judges 
rated five kinds of exemplariness for each of the 50 can-
didates. The ratings of the judges were averaged for use 
as predictors in the regression analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
Exemplar frequencies. The frequencies (as percentages 
of total reports) were averaged over the three student 
samples in Study 1. Beforehand, a natural log transfor-
mation was used to normalize each of the distributions. 
The intraclass correlation of this mean was a strong .90. 
This mean frequency (percentage of total) was then re-
gressed on three blocks of predictors: (a) two control 
variables, (b) three lay prototype variables, and (c) five 
exemplariness variables. Note that the sample size is 50 
because all correlations were calculated across the means 
for 50 exemplars (rather than across participants). 
Control variables. The candidate’s fame and gender 
were considered to be control variables. The intraclass 
correlation of the mean of the fame ratings was high 
(.85) and the reliability of gender is assumed to be 1.00. 
The two variables were entered as a block: They failed 
to make a significant contribution and therefore were 
dropped from consideration.4 Nonsignificance for nomi-
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nee sex indicates that the mean exemplar rate of women 
on our list did not differ significantly from the mean of 
men on our list. Similarly, the fact that fame was not a 
significant predictor reflects the fact that a number of 
individuals receiving high fame ratings (e.g., Elvis, Pa-
mela Anderson, Michael Jordan) were rarely nominated 
as exemplars of intelligence. 
Prototype dimensions. The ratings of the first panel 
of knowledgeable judges were averaged to yield three 
lay prototype variables (problem-solving ability, verbal 
ability, social competence). All reliabilities were strong, 
as indicated by high intraclass correlations: problem-
solving ability (.93), verbal intelligence (.89), and social 
competence (.86). 
The three variables were entered simultaneously 
into an equation predicting exemplar frequency. Note 
from Table 3 that all three predictors reached signifi-
cance at the .05 level. This result confirms that the 50 
exemplars include individuals representing all three 
features of the lay prototype (Sternberg, 1988). Con-
versely, the result confirms that these three prototype 
features provide a meaningful way of distinguishing 
among exemplars. 
Five types of exemplariness. Seven knowledgeable 
judges rated the 50 targets according to how well they 
represented of each of the five subtypes of intelligence, 
that is, scientific intelligence, artistic intelligence, entre-
preneurial intelligence, communicative intelligence, and 
moral intelligence. The labels were not mentioned; in-
stead, the types of intelligence were represented by two 
examples: Type A (Einstein, Hawking), Type B (Mozart, 
Shakespeare), Type C (Bill Gates, Donald Trump), Type 
D (Bill Clinton, Oprah), and Type E (M. L. King, Mother 
Theresa). We also asked these judges to describe the 
type of intelligence captured by each type A through E. 
Their labels largely substantiated our choices. 
To index the degree of consensual meaning in these 
exemplars, we calculated correlations among the seven 
judges’ ratings. The average interrater correlations were 
as follows: scientific (.89), artistic (.69), entrepreneurial 
(.63), communication (.75), and moral (.61). Such values 
indicate varying degrees of agreement among the judges 
in how much the targets represented each subtype of in-
telligence. Nonetheless, their composites all yielded al-
phas greater than .90, thereby permitting averaging for 
further analysis. 
These five mean exemplariness ratings were then 
used to predict the exemplar frequencies. The regression 
results are presented in Table 4. Note that all five exem-
plariness ratings emerged as significant predictors. The 
multiple correlation (R = .64) is also very high,5 indicat-
ing that the five types of intelligence represent a near 
comprehensive taxonomy of famous exemplars. 
Study 4: Famous versus Nonfamous Exemplars of 
Intelligence 
Studies 1 and 2 required that exemplars be limited to 
famous individuals. Unknown is the degree to which 
other individuals (e.g., family members and friends) 
would have been reported as exemplars of intelligence. 
Such information is necessary to clarify the role of ex-
emplars in everyday cognition. In Study 4, therefore, we 
did not constrain nominees to be famous. We also col-
lected various kinds of rating data to help interpret the 
choice of nonfamous exemplars. 
Method 
Exemplars of intelligence (one each) were collected 
from a total of 211 students at the University of British 
Columbia (UBC). The procedure was identical to that in 
Study 1 except that exemplars were not restricted to fa-
mous persons. 
Results and Discussion 
Exemplars were coded as famous if they had re-
ceived some public recognition and therefore were po-
tentially knowable to all our student reporters. They 
were coded as nonfamous only if the reporter had per-
sonally met them. The few public figures that had been 
met were excluded. An overall compilation of the rela-
tive proportions revealed 69% famous and 31% nonfa-
mous exemplars. 
Table 3. Regression of Nomination Likelihood on Three Lay 
Prototype Attributes in Study 3 
                            Regression                                   Correlations 
Prototype          Coefficients 
Attribute                   Beta         t           Sig.    Zero-Order   Partial 
Problem solving  .29  2.38  .02  .37  .33 
Verbal ability  .26  2.11  .04  .34  .34 
Social competence  .31  2.50  .02  .40  .35 
N = 50 exemplars. All t tests are one-tailed. 
Table 4. Regression of Nomination Likelihood on Five Exem-
plariness Ratings in Study 3 
                             Regression                                 Correlations 
Type of               Coefficients 
Intelligence               Beta        t             Sig.    Zero-Order  Partial 
Scientific  .39  3.64  .001  .48  .48 
Artistic  .38  3.41  .001  .27  .45 
Entrepreneurial  .31  2.36  .01  .21  .33 
Communicator  .21  1.68  .05  .27  .24 
Moral  .38  3.00  .002  .32  .41
N = 50 exemplars. All t tests are one-tailed. 
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Famous Exemplars 
To compare with Study 1, we compiled the famous 
exemplars separately. The same popular exemplars ap-
peared near the top of the list (Einstein, Da Vinci, etc.). 
The similarity was confirmed by a strong correlation 
of these frequencies with the UBC exemplar report fre-
quencies from Study 1 (r = .93, p < .01). This strong sim-
ilarity served to assure us (retroactively) that our deci-
sion to restrict nominations to famous persons in Study 
1 did not affect the relative nomination rates of famous 
exemplars. 
Nonfamous Exemplars 
As noted, the nonfamous exemplars accounted for 
31% of the total. Of those, the breakdown was as fol-
lows: acquaintances (22), teachers (20), close friends (16), 
fathers (15), mothers (9), brothers (9), sisters (5), and oth-
ers (4). These relative proportions of family members 
nominated as intelligent are consistent with previous re-
search on people’s estimates of the IQs of their family 
members (Furnham, Fong, & Martin, 1999). For exam-
ple, fathers appear to be viewed as the most intelligent 
family member. 
Multidimensional scaling. Parallel to Study 1, we asked 
a separate set of 16 undergraduate judges to rate the five 
individuals emerging from the nonfamous exemplar re-
ports (smart acquaintance, smart teacher, good friend, 
father, mother, brother, sister, and one other intelligent 
acquaintance). Unfortunately, the correlations among 
the judges’ similarity ratings were rather meager (mean 
r = –.09), thereby precluding a scaling of this sort. Of 
course, this lack of convergence is not surprising given 
that perceptions of family members and friends are in-
herently idiosyncratic. Although Einstein may represent 
a similar form of intelligence to most judges, one’s best 
friend or brother does not. Future analyses of this sort 
will require simultaneous ratings of famous and non-
famous exemplars by the same judges. Because the fa-
mous exemplars yield a more robust structure across in-
dividuals, they could be used to interpret the meaning 
of the nonfamous exemplars. These analyses await fur-
ther data. 
Exemplariness of nonfamous exemplars. Instead, we 
polled another 66 undergraduate judges using the ex-
emplariness technique described earlier. Each judge was 
asked to consider the five types of intelligence A through 
E personified by exemplar pairs: Einstein/ Hawking, 
Mozart/Shakespeare, Gates/Trump, Clinton/Winfrey, 
and King/Mother Theresa. All confirmed that they rec-
ognized the exemplars with the exception that 15% did 
not recognize Stephen Hawking and 3% did not recog-
nize Trump or M. L. King.6 
They were asked to rate the intelligence of six non-
famous individuals (a good friend, mother, father, old-
est brother or sister, an acquaintance, and a teacher) in 
terms of the five kinds of intelligence. The instructions 
were similar to those in Study 1. Results showed that 
teachers were ranked highest on scientific and commu-
nicator intelligence, fathers on entrepreneurial intelli-
gence, mothers on moral intelligence, and friends on ar-
tistic intelligence. 
These analyses were merely exploratory: Any incisive 
analysis of significant others will require the addition of 
other measures along with exemplar reports and rat-
ings. For example, the idiosyncratic nature of personal 
spaces can be dealt with by collecting and analyzing an 
individual’s personal constructs (Kelly, 1963). Among 
the intriguing possibilities is that, compared to nonac-
quaintances, exemplars who are personal acquaintances 
will have a stronger impact on aspirations and self-defi-
nition. Another possibility is that attachment styles bear 
a systematic relation to choice of family members as ex-
emplars of the five types of intelligence. 
General Discussion 
Along with Robert Sternberg (e.g., 1988), Howard 
Gardner has led the recent movement to broaden tra-
ditional conceptions of intelligence (e.g., Gardner, 1993, 
1998). To communicate his arguments for nine distinct 
types of intelligence, Gardner has made effective use of 
famous exemplars such as Einstein, Beethoven, Freud, 
and Darwin.7 A reading of his work reveals the tight in-
terplay of conceptions and exemplars in developing his 
ideas. Accordingly, Gardner’s nine types provide a valu-
able template for comparison with our types. 
Although Gardner’s approach was more rational than 
empirical, his claims concerned real-world differences 
in types of intelligence. Our work was explicitly induc-
tive and empirical but our claims concern implicit types 
of intelligence. We used the exemplar survey method 
(Paulhus & Landolt, 2000) and collected large surveys of 
popular exemplars. As detailed below, our four studies 
supported some of Gardner’s conclusions but not oth-
ers. 8 
Consistency Across Samples 
One notable finding from Paulhus and Landolt (2000) 
was a substantial consistency across 16 years in the most 
popular exemplars of intelligence. An alternative ex-
planation for the observed temporal stability is that all 
surveys were conducted at the same school in the same 
country. In the present studies, therefore, we began by 
comparing samples from a variety of North American 
colleges. We also added a relatively educated adult sam-
ple. Among the most frequently reported exemplars, the 
differences across time and samples were minor. A com-
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mon group of nominees dominated all four lists. Not 
only are nomination rates temporally stable but they 
also converge sufficiently to indicate substantial consen-
sus on the implicit definition of intelligence among edu-
cated North Americans. 
Distinctiveness From Other Constructs 
In Study 2, we examined the popular exemplars of 
intelligence for evidence of discriminant validity with 
respect to other appealing qualities of the nominees, 
namely, their fame, creativity, and wisdom. When we 
compared a sample of nominees for intelligent person 
with a sample of nominees for a famous person, only a 
30% overlap was observed in top 15 lists. A comparison 
of popular exemplars for Sternberg’s (1988) two other 
forms of mental ability revealed minor, although sys-
tematic, overlap across the popular exemplars of intelli-
gence, creativity, and wisdom. These findings are critical 
to verify that judges are not indiscriminately nominat-
ing popular and/or famous people. 
The fact that creativity showed the largest overlap 
with intelligence is consistent with our Study 1 finding 
that artistic intelligence emerged as one of the five types 
of intelligence. Moreover, our overall pattern of over-
lap matched previous estimates of overlap using the 
prototype approach (Sternberg, 1985). In sum, the same 
pattern of distinctiveness previously demonstrated in 
judges’ conceptions of intelligence, creativity, and wis-
dom was confirmed here in our judges’ selections of 
ideal exemplars of those concepts. 
Together, these preliminary studies of exemplars of 
intelligence support arguments that members of a com-
mon culture—in this case North Americans with at least 
some degree of college education—have similar concep-
tions of intelligence (see Berry, 1984; Sternberg, 1988, 
p. 46). When exemplars did lose their popularity over 
time, they were replaced with an exemplar of the same 
type. Lee Iacocca, for example, was replaced by Don-
ald Trump and later by Bill Gates (Paulhus & Landolt, 
2000). This stability in exemplars of intelligence repre-
sents a “shared cognition” that serves to facilitate com-
munication, social interactions, and group decisions (see 
Romney & Moore, 1998; Thompson & Fine, 1999). 
Such implications are weakened by the fact that nom-
inations in Studies 1 and 2 were restricted to famous 
people. In Study 4, that restriction was lifted with the re-
sult that 31% of the exemplars were nonfamous, that is, 
friends, acquaintances, family members, teachers, and 
so forth, and the patterns were coherent; for example, 
fathers best represented scientific intelligence and moth-
ers best represented moral intelligence. 
Our results do not reveal the relative ranks or roles 
that individuals give to famous and nonfamous ex-
emplars, and we do not know what kinds of individ-
uals nominate each. Note that we have used the term 
famous to mean “public”—not necessarily universally 
known. In fact, as noted earlier, the average under-
graduate recognized only 42% of the famous exemplar 
list. From this perspective, the apparent consensus in 
famous exemplars is due, at least in part, to a limited 
common knowledge base, even among the educated. 
We suspect that the more intellectually sophisticated 
among our judges tended to report the more esoteric 
exemplars. 
The Structure of Diversity 
Despite their consistency across time and subgroups, 
the diversity of the intellectual paragons was striking: 
Individuals as varied as Einstein, Shakespeare, Oprah 
Winfrey, Bill Gates, Madonna, Bill Clinton, and Ma-
hatma Gandhi received large numbers of nominations. 
These individuals may well represent distinct subcul-
tures in contemporary society. In any case, no one field 
holds a monopoly on icons of intelligence. 
To clarify this stable diversity of exemplars, we con-
ducted a multidimensional scaling of judges’ similarity 
ratings. The underlying perceptual dimensions were not 
easy to interpret. Instead, the striking feature of these 
analyses was the clustering of five subgroups of exem-
plars. Based on the exemplars, the implicit types of in-
telligence were labeled as scientific, artistic, communica-
tive, entrepreneurial, and moral intelligences. 
Based on the similarity of content and exemplars, 
several of our implicit types can reasonably be mapped 
onto Gardner’s nine intelligences. Our scientific intelli-
gence resembles his logical-mathematical (Einstein), our 
artistic intelligence subsumes his musical and linguistic 
(Shakespeare and Mozart), our communicative intelli-
gence resembles his interpersonal (presidents), and our 
moral intelligence resembles his existential intelligence 
(Dalai Lama). We found little support in the judgments 
of our students for the distinctiveness of Gardner’s spa-
tial, kinesthetic, intrapersonal, or naturalist types of in-
telligence. In addition, unlike our lay judges, Gardner 
has never proposed entrepreneurial acumen as a dis-
tinct form of intelligence. 
In Study 3, we showed that judges were able to use 
exemplars of each of the five types of intelligence to 
guide their judgments of other famous individuals. In 
Study 4, lay judges used the exemplars to guide judg-
ments of friends, family, and teachers. The meaning-
fulness of these judgments was confirmed by the high 
interjudge agreement and the ability of the composite 
ratings to predict actual exemplar frequencies. 
Fame, Salience, and Nomination Rates 
Are the most commonly reported exemplars sim-
ply high profile icons of contemporary society? Sev-
eral pieces of evidence suggest not. First, direct nomi-
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nations of famous individuals in Study 2 yielded a list 
dominated by such cultural icons as Elvis, Ali, and Prin-
cess Diana— individuals rarely nominated as exemplars 
of intelligence. Study 2 also was informative in show-
ing relatively distinct lists of nominees for intelligence, 
creativity, and wisdom: Such distinctiveness could not 
have resulted from use of a single salience heuristic to 
make nominations. Finally, in Study 3, fame was tested 
but failed to predict exemplar rates. In sum, not all cre-
ative, wise, or famous people make good exemplars of 
intelligence. 
We have no doubt that popular exemplars tend to 
be famous people. Highly available individuals are 
more likely to be used as exemplars. Thus, availabil-
ity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for pop-
ularity as an exemplar of intelligence. In addition, the 
exemplar does not have to be available to society as a 
whole, just available to nominators. Each judge’s exem-
plars are prominent in his or her own world. Thus, Paul-
hus and Landolt (2000) found that choice of exemplars 
was highly correlated with rated fame when calculated 
within individuals. The putative requirement of public 
fame is refuted directly by the third of our sample who 
chose family members and friends as their exemplars of 
intelligence. 
Conversely, there are many icons of undeniable ge-
nius (Spinoza, J. S. Mill, M. Curie, etc.) whose cur-
rent fame was insufficient to draw many nominations. 
Rather than a deficiency of the current methodology, 
this absence is simply a demonstration that absolute 
ability and exemplar popularity are not isomorphic. Ob-
scurity is a strong impediment to the nomination of and 
(we would argue) the use of exemplars. 
Implications for Cognition 
We are left with some tentative implications about 
implicit theories of intelligence. As with other important 
concepts, internal representations of the trait “intelli-
gent” appear to include specific exemplars. Those exem-
plars are activated independently of exemplars of other 
mental abilities. An individual’s exemplars must be sa-
lient to the perceiver but not necessarily famous across 
the culture. They need not even be public figures—fam-
ily and friends are a major source of exemplars. 
Our expert judges in Study 1 were able to distinguish 
five subtypes of intelligence: scientific, artistic, entrepre-
neurial, communicative, and moral, and in Study 4, an-
other set of judges found these conceptions sufficiently 
meaningful to provide relatively consensual but orthog-
onal ratings. Moreover, a resemblance to any of the five 
types predicted high nomination ratings. Note that such 
analyses are possible only within an exemplar approach 
to target assessment (Broughton, 1984). 
Our five types of implicit intelligence do not map eas-
ily onto the three lay prototype features of intelligence, 
namely, problem solving, verbal ability, and social com-
petence (Sternberg, 1988). Instead, our intelligence types 
involve combinations of that trio of abilities. For exam-
ple, the charismatic leadership embodied by communi-
cative intelligence would require both verbal ability and 
social competence. Entrepreneurial intelligence might 
weight problem solving heavily but could well include 
verbal ability and social competence. 
Surprising to some readers, no doubt, is the emer-
gence of a distinct moral intelligence. Nonetheless, in 
the eyes of (many of) our relatively educated judges, in-
dividuals such as Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gan-
dhi, Mother Theresa, Jesus Christ, the Dalai Lama, and 
the Pope exemplify intelligence. This finding resonates 
with recent arguments by Emmons (2000) that the abil-
ity to grasp spiritual ideas and apply spiritual resources 
to everyday problems is rightfully considered a form of 
intelligence. Such a finding is a reminder that lay ob-
servers do not share the traditional psychometric ten-
dency to segregate personality from intelligence: They 
see much overlap between the two domains (Ackerman 
& Heggestad, 1997; Paulhus et al., 1998). 
Our exemplar approach is not inconsistent with the 
more established prototype-feature approaches to con-
ceptions of traits (e.g., Broughton, 1984; Chaplin et al., 
1988; Fehr, 1988; Sternberg, 1985). In fact, with available 
techniques, it has been difficult to establish whether cog-
nitive representations of traits are primarily feature based 
(prototype-like), exemplar based, or some combination of 
the two (Barsalou, 1990; Smith & Zarate, 1992). For many 
purposes, of course, it is immaterial whether features pre-
cede exemplars, or vice versa, because once raised, an ex-
emplar feeds back onto the storage of features (Smith & 
Zarate, 1990). Nonetheless, one direction for future re-
search would be to study the cognitive consequences of 
inducing participants to process specific exemplars. 
Future research will also have to clarify the relation 
between the overt report of an exemplar and the under-
lying representation. One could accept reported exem-
plars at face value; that is, whatever process underlies a 
report, the final product constitutes an accurate indica-
tor of the exemplar content of the nominator’s implicit 
theory of intelligence. Ultimately, however, future re-
search will have to tease apart the roles played by such 
mechanisms as value expression (Buss & Briggs, 1984), 
person memory (Mayer & Bower, 1986), impression 
management (Paulhus, 1991), narcissistic bias (Robins 
&John, 1997), and automaticity (Logan, 1988). An overt 
response to an exemplar request may well hide a multi-
tude of whims. 
Future Directions 
We have initiated an empirical exploration of lay ex-
emplars of intelligence—a topic given little previous at-
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tention. Our earlier work (Paulhus, 2000; Paulhus & 
Landolt, 2000) provided initial evidence that famous ex-
emplars might play a role in lay theories of intelligence. 
The present report expanded on those ideas by demon-
strating (a) a consistency across samples and (b) a struc-
tured diversity within those popular paragons. The re-
sults of our research suggest that exemplars do play a 
role in cognitive representations of intelligence. They 
suggest further that exemplar surveys can reveal im-
plicit types. A similar methodology could be applied to 
other trait representations. 
Some of our exemplar results complement and sup-
port previous work using a prototype approach. Some 
of the results go well beyond the earlier work. The find-
ing that implicit theories can entertain five distinct 
types of intelligence is a novel finding. The emergence 
of moral intelligence as a distinct form is most strik-
ing. So too is the absence of evidence for spatial, kines-
thetic, naturalist, and intrapersonal intelligences as dis-
tinct forms. Finally, we see no simple mapping of any of 
our five types onto the currently popular notion of emo-
tional intelligence. 
Further work is required to determine whether the 
five subtypes of intelligence derive from (a) five subcul-
tures of judges each valuing one form of intelligence or 
(b) five categories operating in any judge. Within-person 
clustering would address whether implicit types exist at 
the individual as well as the group level. Most likely is 
that some judges can entertain multiple subtypes of in-
telligence, whereas others can entertain only one type 
(Tetlock & Suedfeld, 1988). 
Although we have identified the implicit types, 
more fundamental laboratory work is required to elu-
cidate the role of exemplars in implicit theories of intel-
ligence. Ideally, exemplar and prototype information 
should be manipulated independently to examine ef-
fects of judgments of intelligence (and more generally, 
the processes involved in making intelligence judg-
ments). Are judgments of intelligence facilitated after 
generating exemplars and/or after generating proto-
types of intelligence? Similarly, does priming a partic-
ular exemplar category affect intelligence ratings? For 
example, if scientific intelligence is primed, are Ein-
stein and Hawking rated more quickly and are they 
perceived as more intelligent than if another category 
is primed? Does irrelevant exemplar information (e.g., 
Einstein’s German accent and moustache) eventually 
become imbued with intelligence? 
We encourage others to examine possible links be-
tween implicit types and previously established aspects 
of implicit theories of intelligence. One is the influential 
distinction between entity and incremental lay theories 
(e.g., Dweck, 1996). Do lay entity and incremental theo-
rists use different exemplars—ones exemplifying innate 
genius versus hard work, respectively? Another poten-
tial connection is with defensive self-definitions of intel-
ligence demonstrated in the research by Dunning and 
colleagues (e.g., Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 
1989). When individuals are threatened by a current def-
inition of intelligence,9 do their exemplars switch along 
with the definitional attributes? 
Broader Implications 
At the cultural level, the present research has impli-
cations for the sociology of intellectual icons. Recall C. 
P. Snow’s (1959) influential distinction between two 
distinctive forms of intelligence—scientific and liter-
ary. He argued that these two aspects of Western cul-
ture represented two groups and modes of thought 
that were almost mutually incomprehensible to one 
another. Our work suggests an even more complex set 
of five views of intelligence operating simultaneously 
in our sample of educated observers.10 Ultimately, they 
represent five prominent values, each generating a 
conception of intelligence that advances the value. Al-
though they are necessarily determined by social his-
tory (Simonton, 1994; Snow, 1959), popular exemplars 
may, in turn, feed back onto social events (Gardner, 
1993; Ruzgis & Grigorenko, 1994). By association, cur-
rently popular exemplars may indirectly influence the 
image of various foreign countries, their citizens, their 
dress, and their accents, and the centrality of their ex-
emplars in language and culture may modulate any 
trend toward a change in values.11 Once the name “Ein-
stein” rather than Shakespeare came to personify intel-
ligence in the Western world, the relative impact of sci-
ence and literature in the 20th century may have been 
largely determined. 
Finally, our demonstration of diversity within stable 
clusters of intellectual paragons recapitulates the cur-
rent tension between diversity and standardization in 
intellectual circles. Diversity advocates warn of the re-
strictive effects of teaching only traditional icons. Stan-
dardization partisans argue that common icons provide 
a common dialect for discussions of intellectual achieve-
ment (Bloom, 1988). In this spirit, Hirsch (1988) has ar-
gued that, arbitrary or not, such icons provide the lin-
guistic currency necessary for a flourishing culture. Our 
demonstration of a limited number of worldviews sug-
gests that a judicious selection of five intellectual icons 
would suffice. 
Notes 
1. Other advances in implicit theories of intelligence include determin-
ing its structural location in implicit theories of personality (Rosen-
berg & Sedlak, 1972), the self-serving nature of its definitions (Dun-
ning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989), and the entity-incremental 
distinction (e.g., Dweck, 1996). 
2. To make the 15-person list, nominees had to rank in the top 25 on 
several surveys. 
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3. Although not in the top 15, Einstein was close on the wisdom list 
and King was close on the intelligence list. Indeed, King did make 
the overall top 15 in Study 1. 
4. Nonsignificant control variables should not be retained in sub-
sequent steps. Otherwise, a valid portion of variance may be 
discarded. 
5. Note that the maximum attainable value is only .77 because neither 
the criterion nor the predictors are perfectly reliable. 
6. In all these cases, judges recognized the other paired exemplar al-
lowing them to do the ratings. 
7. His nine intelligences with exemplars were linguistic (T. S. Eliot, 
Chomsky, Auden, Angelou), logical-mathematical (Einstein, White-
head, Curie, Ulam, Poincaré), musical (Stravinsky, Beethoven, Ber-
nstein, Midori, Coltrane), spatial (Michelangelo, F. L. Wright, Kasp-
arov, H. Frankenthaler, H. Nevelson), kinesthetic (M. Graham, M. 
Jordan, M. Marceau), interpersonal (Ghandi, Eleanor Roosevelt, 
Mao), personal (Freud, Mead, Proust), naturalist (Darwin), and ex-
istential (Dalai Lama, Sartre, Kierkegaard). 
8. Note that our data collection began before the appearance of Gard-
ner’s work. 
9. This near-universal tendency to label oneself as intelligent helps ex-
plain the rather modest correlation between self-perceptions and 
IQ tests (Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998). 
10. Note again that Gardner’s is an explicit theory of intelligence: It 
claims that multiple types of intelligence actually exist. Our work 
addresses variations in implicit theories, that is, lay conceptions of 
intelligence. 
11. Note that there is no need to validate the actual intellectual abil-
ity of exemplars. The only issue is whether society attributes intelli-
gence to them (Kasof, 1995). 
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